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Phenomenology in the American Vein
Justus Buchler’s Ordinal Naturalism and its Importance for
the Justification of Epistemic Objects∗
Leon Niemoczynski†
In this essay, I explore Justus Buchler’s ordinal naturalism with
the goal of establishing how his phenomenological approach
extends the range of human inquiry to include the many and
varied traits of natural phenomena that are not “simply” the
result of sensate experience or material functions. To achieve this
goal I critically assess Buchler’s notion of “ontological parity”–the
idea that abstract phenomena such as values, relations, ideals,
and other mental contents are just as relevant as sense-data
when one attempts to provide an adequate description of the
world in naturalistic terms. I argue that certain phenomena,
subsisting within what Buchler calls the “proceptive domain,” are
legitimate objects of knowledge as they are part of a larger
domain of phenomenological analysis: nature more broadly and
justly understood. It is my view that in the attempt to describe
the natural world Buchler’s ordinal naturalism succeeds where
other forms of naturalism fail because his form of naturalism
offers a more capacious view of nature that attempts to describe
whatever is in any way, not just focus on what is readily apparent
to specific forms of observation that may privilege one domain
of analysis over another. I draw the conclusion that because
Buchler’s ordinal naturalism contains within it a working principle
of ontological parity, his approach to nature fulfills the criteria of
the phenomenological method, and so I title his ordinal naturalism
an ordinal phenomenology (Corrington 1992, 1-6, 9-14). Ultimately
it is my aim to bring Buchler’s thought into closer connection with
continental phenomenology, as well as to illustrate a more just and
open understanding of nature through an analysis of his unique
variety of philosophical naturalism.
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I. TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN NATURALISM
American naturalism, as it was developed in the twentieth century and
continues today, is a distinct school of thought that believes that nature is
available to philosophical inquiry. Philosophers like John Dewey, George
Santayana, John Herman Randall, and F.J.E. Woodbridge claimed that
“empirical observation and evidence in the process of inquiry” best provide
means toward knowledge and explanatory closure of a fully “natural”
world (Ryder 1994, 15). Just what nature, or what sort of inquiry and the
knowledge it produces about nature, is a matter of debate. Naturalism,
at the very least, holds that “whatever there might be is entirely an
aspect of nature” (Ryder 1994, 13-14). The import of this claim comes
from understanding naturalism’s view that “nature” admits no supernatural
realm; there is nothing “outside” of nature, or one might say that there is
nothing “other than” the natural.
Like empiricism, naturalism takes seriously the ideas that empirical
observation, sense perception, and evidence are the central components
in giving knowledge of the world. It avoids the speculative metaphysical
tradition and its Platonic surplus of another, ideal world. Naturalism tends,
rather, to favor the scientific method as the best method for obtaining
knowledge about a world as it eschews metaphysical speculation and
intuition in favor of public verifiability. That is, if one wants knowledge then
one should appeal to empirical evidence to get it, not speculate about
the otherworldly. It should be no surprise, then, that some of naturalism’s
major proponents, whether the classical American pragmatist John Dewey,
or the more contemporary naturalistic thinker, John Shook, have praised
the scientific method as the best method for achieving knowledge about
the natural world. As Dewey, Hook, and Nagel put it in their article, “Are
Naturalists Materialists?,” “in maintaining that scientific method is the most
reliable method for achieving knowledge, the naturalist means what he
says” (1945, 111).
Consequently, some naturalists have drawn the inference that certain
features of the world, if not included within the scope of an empirically
given and scientifically verifiable nature, do not meaningfully contribute
to knowledge. Put another way, naturalism’s main claim that there is
nothing beyond nature means, from an epistemological viewpoint, that
realms completely beyond nature could in principle never yield empirically
verifiable knowledge, and from a metaphysical viewpoint, that there simply
are no worlds beyond the empirical world.1 Similar to a species of
1Interestingly, a hidden problem in the naturalist’s account of knowledge already
at this point is presented: if one is to positively outright deny the existence of the
supernatural, then how does the concept come to play in natural experience (at all) so as
to meaningfully be denied?
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logical positivism, naturalism states that to be meaningfully known is
to be evidenced in a fully natural world that human beings come to
know through empirical testing and observation. I might summarize these
ideas by stating in the negative: not natural means nonexistent, and
not-meaningfully-known. As F.J.E. Woodbridge wrote, “knowledge is of
what we perceive, and I have named that ‘Nature.’ I can find, however,
no convincing reason for turning what we perceive into a substitute for
something else” (1994, 66).
Naturalism in the form just outlined typically leads to a problem that
I title “experiential discrimination.” The problem might be understood
by asking the following question: On what basis within the naturalist’s
framework are inquirers to discriminate what counts as an epistemic
object, a legitimate object of knowledge? Surely a distinction must
be made between what is “natural,” and therefore what is capable of
supporting empirical observation in an “objectively determinate world,” and
what is “supernatural,” that is, what is claimed to be beyond this world
and beyond the realm of genuine knowledge–according to the naturalist’s
definition of what can count as knowledge, stated above (Ryder 1994, 20).
On what basis are we to admit one trait of experience and yet deny another
if nature is all that there is?
Naturalism does not invoke the Kantian answer that a priori structures
of the human mind delimit what can or cannot count as legitimate objects of
knowledge.2 Naturalism, at least in the American tradition, follows Hume
in denying that there are any concrete, rational, a priori givens that will
hold necessarily for the acquisition of knowledge. Matters of fact–that
is, ephemeral states of affairs within an ever-changing nature–permit no
a priori categories of knowledge to hold permanently during nature’s
ever-changing and deeply contingent evolutionary course. This means
that there are no grounds to claim that there is anything metaphysically
necessary about the world, or necessary about what we may know about
the world, for we are a species that is fully a part of, and wholly immersed
within, an always-changing, deeply contingent nature. On this view nothing
is fixed or final (epistemologically or metaphysically speaking) because
human beings are part and parcel of nature. As F.J.E. Woodbridge put it,
an appeal to the stars, the seasons, the swarm of animals,
and the rest is an appeal to the ultimately supreme court of
all knowledge. Setting ourselves apart is like setting anything
else apart. It gives us “Nature and man” just as it gives us
2Again, one might rightly ask whether naturalists are inadvertently using a Kantian
noumenal (supernatural beyond) to help affirm what is just a phenomenal appearance of
nature.
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“Nature and the sun.” . . . Is it not time, I am forced to ask, to
stop such nonsense and cease to think, as Hume apparently
did, that what is called ‘human nature’ is not only the source of
knowledge but also the only thing that we know about it? Is it
not time to stop identifying experience with what we experience
and trying to have philosophies of ‘pure experience’? (1994, 61)
And John Herman Randall elaborated that “. . . naturalism finds itself in
thoroughgoing opposition to all forms of thought which assert the existence
of a supernatural or transcendental Realm of Being and which makes
knowledge of that realm a fundamental importance to human living” (1944,
358). For the naturalists, then, nature does not represent any beyond; it is
simply what we perceive it to be.
II. NATURALISM’S PENCHANT FOR SCIENCE AND A PHYSICAL WORLD
From this point, some naturalists, such as W.V.O. Quine, have
concluded that what provides the greatest deal of certainty when it
comes to knowledge is an external physical world and its corresponding
sense-data. Nature is physical bodies in motion, and what one knows best
about the world may be stated in terms of describing those bodies; that is,
in the language of the natural sciences. As naturalism’s empirical theme
suggests, knowledge of the natural world consists of knowing facts about
a physical external world based on an inductive trial-and-error basis, and
the valuation of those facts is said to be a human addition. It is no secret
that Quine was obsessed with the replacement of normative epistemology
with empirical psychology, favoring the sensate and physical terms of
experience. As he put it, “two cardinal tenets of empiricism remained
unassailable, however, and so remain to this day. One is that whatever
evidence there is for science is sensory evidence. The other, to which I
shall recur, is that all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately
on sensory evidence” (Quine 1969, 75). And in an oft-quoted passage from
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine wrote that
physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation
as convenient intermediaries–not by definition in terms of
experience, but simply as irreducible posts comparable,
epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that
for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects
and not in Homer’s gods; and I consider it a scientific error to
believe otherwise. (Quine 1961, 44)
Certainly the empirical strain of naturalism asserts that nonphysical
aspects of nature (in the case of this discussion, abstract mental contents)
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are, if not completely reducible to physical terms, best expressed by them.
This preference for a physical nature (and its corresponding sense-data),
and the scientific observation and consequent explanation of such a
physical nature, enforces a longstanding dualism between a physical
nature, or “matters of fact” (typically “outside” of the mind), and “relations
of ideas” (found merely “in” the mind). One can most adequately trace
this fact/value dualism back to David Hume. Many forms of naturalism,
ultimately, have followed Hume in a sensationistic doctrine of perception
that, when taken far enough, can lead to problematic forms of skepticism,
especially when a wedge is driven between what is a “fact of nature” and
what is an “idea about nature.”3
The sensationistic doctrine of perception essentially asserts that our
experience of nature is limited to the types of things that the senses are
suited to perceive.4 Hume’s argument was a beginning point for such
a view, but he did not go so far as to claim that one could “know”
with any degree of certainty a physical world. Hume’s claim was that
perception can give us nothing but “sense-data,” and some naturalists,
such as George Santayana, followed Hume in taking a skeptical route
about an external physical world. Santayana pointed out that the doctrine
of sensationism could only lead to a “solipsism of the present moment,” or
a “show of the present moment,” where sense-data are the only reliable
sources of knowledge–albeit a “knowledge” limited to the current moment
where any drawn inferences that point beyond the present moment are
done so only according to “animal faith,” not rational certainty (Santayana
1955a). The denial of knowledge follows (and here I mean the sort
of knowledge that naturalists are seeking: publicly verifiable knowledge)
because anything not evidenced directly by sense-data cannot not be
located in an “objectively determinate world,” and there is no subsequent
3It seems that, for American naturalists, human beings are part of nature, and hence
everything in their minds is part of nature as well. But if epistemology is naturalized,
then why are human values (or other objects of knowledge not found directly in sense
perception) considered “mere,” “secondary,” “less significant” or somehow “less natural”
when it comes to publicly demonstrable forms of knowledge? Metaphysically speaking,
is it possible that I know that I am anxious in a room full of people, despite me not
telling anyone or not having anyone intersubjectively verify and confirm that such is my
experience? It is interesting to note, as Jaegwon Kim has, that American naturalism was
and still is a good less sensitive toward, or even unconcerned with, metaphysical issues
in this context. See, Jaegwon Kim, “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism,”
Journal of Philosophical Research APA Centennial Volume (2003): 88.
4Although some skeptical naturalists will not go so far as to say that sense-data
“proves” the existence of external physical objects. Others in the naturalist tradition follow
John Locke, for example, rather than Hume, and argue that objects in an external world
contain the power to produce certain sensations under certain conditions.
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certainty beyond the sense-data.5 Thus, there can be no foundation for
real knowledge, let alone a reality beyond sense-data, if one follows the
empirical theory of knowledge through to its most extreme conclusions.
Naturalists such as Santayana have concluded from this line of thought
that abstract phenomena, not perceived directly in sense-data, could not
be “natural” and either do not “really” exist, at least in any meaningful
way, or that non-perceptual phenomena cannot contribute to publicly
demonstrable knowledge–that is, scientific knowledge. Santayana’s
Humean skepticism thus challenges any form of knowledge: not only does
Santayana challenge the supernatural, he claims that there is nothing
beyond the “show of the present moment,” even in this world (Santayana
1955b, 33-40). Yet here I must point out that not all naturalists are skeptics
toward the possibility of knowledge, as Santayana most certainly is, but
naturalists of this variety are certainly skeptical about a priori knowledge,
or any form of knowledge that is about objects beyond immediate sense
perception. If something is to count as a legitimate “epistemic object”
(an object of knowledge), then it must be empirically observable within
an objectively determinate world. So far as metaphysics is concerned, I
certainly do not intend to say that naturalists are proponents of a brute
eliminative materialism or supervenience physicalism, views that state that
there are no other base realities than physical realities, when it comes
to an empirical theory of reality and knowledge of it. I only mean to
suggest that for naturalists, a physical world is the basis for meaningful
knowledge. For example, in denying the “accusation” that naturalism is
materialism pure and simple, Dewey, Hook, and Nagel maintained,“the
occurrence of a mental event is contingent upon the occurrence of certain
complex physico-chemico-physiological events. . . ” (1945, 107; emphasis
mine). This contingency seems to suggest that non-sensate perceptual
experiences reduce to, or at the very least depend upon, the material
conditions that the senses perceive. Evidence for scientific knowledge is
sensory evidence (Quine) and so goes the naturalist preference for the
physical world that produces sense-data.
While a thorough discussion of sense-data empiricism and skepticism
goes beyond my concern, I would like to emphasize that the form of
naturalism under discussion here places the abstract, or what I shall
call the “intangible” phenomena of experience, at the “beck and call” of
material functions that are ultimately “physical” in nature (an “intangible”
would include abstract mental content including values, relations, and
5For an experiment to pass the test of public verification, Santayana’s extreme form
of skepticism would bar one observer from actually knowing whether another observer
had experienced the same “show of the present moment” that had just passed during the
moment in which the experiment had taken place.
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ideals that make for the experience of consciousness and subjectivity;
the experience of freedom and the self; and also religious, aesthetic,
logical, and moral value). While naturalists do “emphatically acknowledge
that men are capable of thought, feeling, and emotion. . . in consequence
these powers are contingent upon the organization of human bodies. . . ”
(Dewey, Hook, and Nagel 1945, 110; emphasis mine). What is more, it
seems that contemporary naturalism seems to insist along with Dewey
and others that “the question of the truth of materialism of this type can
be decided only on the basis of empirical evidence alone” (Dewey, Hook,
and Nagel 1945, 107). My question is simply this: Why place these sorts
of epistemic objects (objects of nature that are intangible in character) into
a less significant role when providing for an account of the natural world?
Moreover, if one cannot empirically test and observe such objects within a
public realm, is meaningful knowledge about these objects impossible?
Again, I am beginning here with the most problematic aspects of how
naturalists make key distinctions between what is natural (the physical
world, sense-data, and the subsidiary mental experiences that the world
produces) and what is taken to be not natural. I do not wish to take
naturalism to task on these issues because one may object that the
world produces ideas, and that the scientific method may indeed be
applied to ideas. So ideas are fully natural as they belong to human
minds–products of nature–and science is fully capable of dealing with
human minds. (Although even this may be problematic given the hard
problem of consciousness: why should the physical processing of the
brain give rise to a rich inner life at all?) But with the exclusion of
valuations, ideals, morality, and religious experience from the realm of
publicly verifiable and scientific knowledge, I only ask whether a more
adequate description of nature might be warranted if one has the aim to
describe nature in its most broad and just terms.6
The naturalist’s answer to this criticism, of course, is that physical
bodies and their corresponding empirical data directly pertain to the
“publicly demonstrable” claims of the scientific method, deemed to be
the best method for obtaining knowledge–so certainly the scientific claim
6Such an exclusion may be more insidious than I am presenting it here. Stephen
Turner writes that the exclusionary practices of (scientific) expert claims routinely “affect,
combat, refute, and negate” some faction or group of persons who subscribe to a
particular set of valuations. For example, “when scientists proclaim the truth of Darwinism,
they refute, negate, and whatnot the Christian view of the creation, and thus Creations.
When research is done on racial differences, it affects, negates, and so on, those
who are negatively characterized.” Expert claims and the exclusion of some portions of
experience and knowledge can have dire consequences. See Stephen Turner, “Political
Epistemology, Experts and the Aggregation of Knowledge” Spontaneous Generations
(2007).
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upon nature is warranted as nature is fundamentally physical. Knowledge
of the world is empirical knowledge, it is knowledge that “the naturalists
maintain is publicly verifiable” (Dewey, Hook, and Nagel 1945, 111). Any
object that is to count as an object of knowledge must be in principle
verifiable by what science deems “acceptable” in terms of an observation
and consequent intersubjective confirmation–that is, observation of an
empirical world through the judgment of sense perception and following
agreement about its legitimacy.7 Public confirmability is the test for all
scientific knowledge (Kim 2003, 96) and “as naturalism envisages the
nature of this method. . . the method is applicable only to things which
are physical or ‘public’ and not to states and events which are mental or
‘private’” (Dewey, Hook, and Nagel 1945, 110).
I believe that naturalism’s claim that the scientific method is the best
way to know nature is problematic in two ways, if the scientific method
entails the subscribing to sense-data empiricism as outlined above. First,
while the intangible epistemic objects of human experience are part of
nature, naturalism does not see these phenomena as legitimate regions
of inquiry to be known through the application of the scientific method
because they have no publicly verifiable character.8 Second, while the
intangibles of nature “exist,” they only exist with a subsidiary status
compared to the objective determinations of a physical world.9 When
it comes to regarding the ontological status of abstract mental content,
naturalism incessantly invokes a preference for explaining the conditions
of the physical or material world, and not the related abstract experience of
it. Interestingly, naturalists warn against a “fallacy of selective emphasis”
(a fallacy stating that one should not, after abstracting from experience,
treat the resultant abstraction as primary or more real than the experience
7Communication of personal experiences or subjective mental experiences would
presumably not be enough to warrant knowledge, at least as the type of naturalism under
discussion here characterizes it. Hence William James’ most notable difference from
naturalism and closer tie to phenomenology, which takes seriously descriptive reports
of first-person experience. See Pragmatism Considers Phenomenology, eds. Corrington,
Hausman, and Seebohm (1987).
8Paul Weiss was a philosopher who, along with Buchler, challenged the idea that public
verifiability should be linked with the capability of some phenomenon to be “known” within
personal or private experience unconnected to others. Paul Weiss, Privacy (Weiss 1983,
1-16). Weiss maintains that there are different kinds of evidence that will enable one to
remark about familiarity with the natural world.
9By “objective determination” I mean that a subjective experience, for example, should
only exist if the physical parts of the brain produce that experience. “Material transactions”
producing intangible experience would be another way to describe this: the technical term
in the philosophy of mind is “epiphenomenalism.” Consciousness or subjectivity rides on
the material components that produce it.
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from which it was abstracted).10 Despite the admonition, naturalism does
emphasize sense perception of an external world: it is a thinly disguised
species of positivism where the physical world is taken to be primary and
more “real” than the abstraction associated with it.
These problems are precisely what phenomenologists have taken
issue with, in the sense that all mental contents are subordinated to the
physical transactions of the world, rather than being represented as mutual
inhabitants of the world as such. Not all epistemic contents have clear
and concrete empirical sense correlates, so it would be wrong to assume
that explaining physical causes of abstract phenomena gets to the heart
of explaining related abstract phenomena fully and completely. Thus one
finds that the intangible phenomena of experience are “simply” the result of
material functions in a physical world, and one finds that the physical world
is the most important category of description when it comes to knowledge.
Again, I do not mean to claim that naturalists outright deny that there are
experiences of abstract realities. But many naturalists do downgrade these
sorts of experiences (aesthetic, value driven, ideal, moral, and religious
experience) to the realm of non-knowledge, for these sorts of experiences
are incapable of standing up to “critical scrutiny” of the scientific method
and they also cannot be verified by a community to stand as knowledge. It
should be noted that Dewey and company did try to formulate a naturalism
in which values and ends, both moral and aesthetic, are taken as real and
legitimate. However, because science–their preferred method–can only
define nature through a scheme of ideas that takes seriously just empirical
data, the intangibles of experience are more often than not left out as
legitimate objects of knowledge–nevermind that the ontological status of
the knower who is experiencing these intangibles is put into question. John
E. Smith summarizes this point in the following way, “One might say that
Dewey laid such stress on the objective and public nature of experience
that there are grounds for questioning whether he did justice to its personal
and individualized aspects. . . he did not indeed omit this dimension of
experience, but no reader of Dewey can entirely suppress the impulse
to ask from time to time the question, ‘Whose experience?”’ (Smith 1987,
86).11
10For Dewey’s discussion of selective emphasis, see Experience and Nature (Dewey
2007, 29-31).
11Of course I do not mean to suggest that Dewey believed that there was something
like a “substantial self.” However, when coming so close to a reductionistic sense-data
form of empiricism, Dewey’s naturalism comes close to falling headlong into a philosophy
that has no subjectively experiencing knower; there would be only transactions of
physical materials, and “the self” would be “nothing more” than those physical or material
transactions, perhaps even identical to them. Yet, what, after all, is a transaction? A
motion, discharge of stimuli, or something else? Postmodern skeptics would contest his
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In my judgment, then, the form of naturalism discussed so far requires
reinterpretation because it becomes so intent on denying the supernatural
that it actually ends up unnecessarily excluding the abstract components
of experience that clearly can and do contribute to knowledge (knowledge
of the self or knowledge of the ideal laws that govern the universe,
for example). Such exclusion comes under the supposition that aspects
of nature that are not directly perceived by the senses simply cannot
be real, at least in any relevant way, and consequently they cannot
count as legitimate objects of knowledge. A better account of how to
discriminate the most relevant features of nature is required because even
if naturalism does attempt to readmit intangibles into its purview one must
ask why these features’ relevance for knowledge is subordinated to public
verifiability as well as to the material or physical conditions that supposedly
produce and control intangible subjective experiences (assuming that the
way in which a scientific community determines the validity of a subjective
experience is a completely benign process–a process in which subjective
experiences are placed under the scrutiny of a scientific community whose
“experts” determine whether some form of experience is “real” or not, and
may or may not contribute to an edifice of knowledge). If the naturalist
were to answer that only material conditions of the physical world may
answer to science, and science is what best provides public, verifiable
claims to truth–i.e., “knowledge”–then the very laws of discrimination that
the scientific method uses to observe and predict the world come into
question. Jaegwon Kim addresses this very point:
But what is scientific method? Most contemporary naturalists
are likely to wince, if not laugh, at the idea of there being some
monolithic “method” that characterizes all science everywhere.
In these Postmodern times, when we have all read and, to one
degree or another, internalized Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Rorty,
many of us may not even be sure whether or not there is
such a thing as “science” as a natural kind, a type of human
activity regulated by a set of general principles of rationality and
evidence. There is no question that skepticism about science
and scientific method leads directly to skepticism about the
coherence of the naturalistic program. For naturalism to make
sense as a philosophical doctrine, the idea of science as a
reasonably well-defined activity with a shared commitment to
a set of methodological principles, however broad and diverse
they may be, is essential. (Kim 2003, 88)
claim here. Intangibles such as the interplay of social force or power seem to be left out
when it comes to the construction of a self.
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If we are to provide a wholly adequate description of nature then
nature’s intangible features must be taken into account in addition to those
features that are given directly in sense perception that correlate to an
external world. A more adequate form of naturalism must make sense
of the many and varied traits of natural phenomena, so all features of
experience must be accounted for and treated with equal scrutiny in a
more generic scheme of nature that places no selective emphasis on any
portion of experience.12 Admittedly, the abstract portion of experience may
offer no concrete or clear sensate correlate. These intangibles are, in some
sense, beyond sense perception, at least according to the naturalist’s
criteria defined so far in this paper. But, these traits of experience are
not beyond the reality of a perceivable nature. A more adequate form of
naturalism, then, must also account for how these experienced abstract
realities do exist and do inform the very basis of what it means to
comprehend or self-understand and to act based on that comprehension
and self-understanding, in short, to subjectively experience what would
count as knowledge about the world.
Perhaps as a surprise to the reader I believe that a more wholly
adequate form of naturalism is present within the very history of naturalism
itself–in this case, a sort of naturalism called ordinal naturalism, developed
by the somewhat obscure philosopher Justus Buchler (1914-1991). On
my view, Buchler’s ordinal naturalism is able to offer a broader naturalist
conceptual framework that valiantly resists the gravity of scientism,
physicalism, and materialism as it aims to encompass aspects of nature
“reflected by the sciences and arts, by moral and religious attitudes, and by
what takes place psychologically, socially, technologically” (Buchler 1951).
III. BUCHLER’S ORDINAL NATURALISM
Outside immediate circles of study within the contemporary American
philosophical tradition Buchler is not well known. His doctoral dissertation,
Charles Peirce’s Empiricism, published in 1939, earned him the
designation of a Peirce commentator. After publishing a few books, all
written in highly idiosyncratic and technical terms, Buchler isolated himself
from a larger philosophical community that had grown used to the (at
times) unsophisticated and common-sense writing style of the classical
American pragmatists. Buchler’s mild criticisms of cherished philosophers
such as John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead did not help, either. What
is important here, however, is one of Buchler’s central concepts, that of
12I note that other than broadening the criteria for what to include within a description
of nature, that it might be helpful to again look carefully at the category of “expert opinion”
and those in the public realm who are determining what valuations found in human
conduct are significant to a category of “scientific knowledge.”
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“ontological parity.” I will introduce this concept within the context of this
paper and then apply it to the debate outlined above. I shall emphasize
Buchler’s phenomenological moments showing his philosophy to be an
ordinal phenomenology.
Buchler’s philosophical perspective hinges on the concept of
“ontological parity,” the idea that abstract phenomena such as ideas,
relations, values, and judgments–part of what he called “the proceptive
domain”–are just as relevant as sense-data when one attempts to provide
an adequate description of the natural world. The “proceptive domain,”
simply put, suggests “the inseparable union of process with receptivity, of
movement in nature with impact by nature, of things shaped with events
accepted. The emphasis is on historicity and natural involvement” (Buchler
1955, 143). This means that the proceptive domain functions “not merely
in the mind” but is of an intangible character in the sense that it is part of the
individual’s experience (Buchler 1955, 124; see also Merleau-Ponty 1969).
Experience for Buchler means that there are no sharp divisions between
a reality as it is in itself and one’s related experience of it (Buchler 1966).
Thus the assumption that knowledge is somehow inferior to an external
world has no place in his account of nature. As Buchler put it, “feelings,
thoughts, or judgments. . . must be precepts. . . ” and “we assimilate not just
sensible qualities, but changing modes of thought and the ethical temper
of society” (Buchler 1951, 18). He concludes that the proceptive domain
cannot be either merely mental or merely physical.
“Ontological parity” means that within the proceptive domain that which
is being related is on equal footing with the relation itself, therefore abstract
phenomena find their place in a natural scheme. That is, whatever may
be (nature understood in its broadest terms)–including for Buchler values,
ideals, moral judgments, and religious experience but also universals,
particulars, actualities, possibilities, and God–all items of nature “inhabit
the same ontological plane” and justly carry the same integrity as physical
phenomena. This means that while the objects of nature vary in their
pervasiveness or influence, none has a more basic ontological status
or function than any other. Nature is thus “flat” because no aspect of
nature, whether physical or metaphysical, is privileged in a hierarchy
of importance.13 Phenomenologically speaking, ontological parity means
that nature now can be taken to mean, as Buchler puts it, “whatever
is in any way” (see Buchler 1966). This understanding of nature, when
taken in the context of the proceptive domain, is crucial because one can
maintain a category wide enough to describe nature, whatever it turns
out to be. Within nature whatever one discriminates is a legitimate object
13Although ordinality “flattens” nature, one can open any degree of “depth” to nature by
inviting a line of query into its continued availability of orders.
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of knowledge, if by “knowledge” one means first, an acquaintance with
nature, and second, a description of nature that may or may not be publicly
verifiable in the terms discussed thus far.
Rather than speak of “experience,” Buchler speaks of “proception,”
“an all-embracing movement characteristic of individual life,” which
includes the entirety of nature: physical, social, genetic, morphological,
physiological, intellective, and affective,” where “all feeding impulses,
habits, and dispositions, ensure the outcome of the process is human”
(Buchler 1955, 109). Buchler does not speak of the immediate perception
of “sense experience,” but rather the awareness of “proception” in order
to better speak of the diverse dimensions to nature. Adopting this new
term, “proception,” Buchler believed, would shed previous associations
and encumbrances attached to the word “experience” and cast a new
phenomenological dimension to knowledge (see also Merleau-Ponty
1969, 106-107). To clarify, he wrote that,
most of the current terms [proception, proceive, procept]
roughly synonymous with ‘experiencing’ are not only terms
signifying ‘mental operations’ but are derivatives of the
supposed subject-object relation–perceiving, feeling, knowing,
and the like. The term ‘involvement’. . . expresses first, the
common presence and common relevance of all the relata
or determinants of proception, and second, the modification
imposed by proception on all its relata. To be involved is to be
affected or uniquely modified by a relation. (Buchler 1955, 143)
The domain of proception is fully relational between knower and known,
if such a division can be made at all, and it does not correspond with
“the data of experience” in the traditional sense discussed earlier in this
essay. Nor does empirical observation or perceiving “sense-data” retain its
original meaning. With this new phenomenological conception “knowing”
nature takes place through becoming aware of the natural world and by
describing that world. Buchler wrote that these descriptions are continually
“enlarged” and “re-patterned” (Buchler 1955, 109). Arguing that knowing
nature means being acquainted with it through awareness and not brute
“sense perception,” Buchler wrote that, “most ‘empiricist’ philosophers
think that the world becomes experientially available through ‘data.’ And
there would be nothing wrong with this if the ‘data’ were construed not as
noises and patches, or even as tables and chairs, but the circumstances
of rearing and growth, as pervasive imperceptible moral influences, as the
structures of human togetherness, as the contingent stimuli to curiosity
and emotion, as the boundaries imposed by the facts of society, heredity,
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and mortality. . . . [In all of this] it is truly awareness that is most prominent”
(Buchler 1955, 126; Merleau-Ponty 1969, 106-107).
Proception for Buchler suggests a “closeness” to nature that is
fully natural, genuine, and that communicates knowledge by direct
phenomenological acquaintance that can be communicated in a variety of
ways to other inquirers, although this communication is not a requirement
for knowledge per se (see Buchler 1955 on “exhibitive judgment”). This
acquaintance is found in the individual mental experiences that human
inquirers undergo so as to understand nature. For example one may
value, consider ideals, and judge where these experiences further one’s
acquaintance from within a personal context. This personal context may
then be used to understand a social or public context, where “social” or
“public” can be interpreted to mean the larger context of nature itself (see
Merleau-Ponty 1969, 109-10).14 Thus Buchler thought that the personal
perspective can move toward a validation if it so chooses, but it does
not necessarily have to achieve intersubjective validation so as to be
considered real knowledge. One can most certainly assimilate the world
and communicate that assimilation to one’s self through various forms of
judgment, but public verifiability and consequent scientific appraisal is not
a strict requirement for being acquainted with the natural world.
For Buchler, physicalism is the “narrow” version of naturalism
(Ryder 1991, 201). Rather than take nature to be “levels” of material
functions–and rather than understanding consciousness, the experience
of freedom, valuation, judgment, and so on to be products of those
functions–one finds Buchler assigning relevance to all levels of nature
by placing them on an equal plane with his notion of ontological parity.
Here one finds that Buchler’s concept of ontological parity is tied to his
“ordinal” position: an ordinal ontology acknowledges nature’s objective
determinateness on equal footing with human activity and the intangibles
of the proceptive domain. When attempting to describe nature, one can
phenomenologically avoid ascribing any primacy to the material or physical
orders of nature, yet one can also maintain that the various orders of
nature are still related and equally relevant–whether strongly or weakly,
depending upon one’s line of analysis. On the ordinal view, one is able to
think about nature relationally, while considering the epistemic objects that
are typically relegated to a lesser role in many other naturalistic ontologies
14One of Buchler’s major critiques was that human query often reads a human face
upon nature. In other words, nature gets the last vote when it comes to what counts
as real and legitimate, not the previous policies of experts and decision-makers in a
scientific community; those viewpoints can be overturned. On Buchler’s view, the ultimate
“social” context of the natural world is an encompassing nature itself (which could never
be any particular category), not the verifiability tests of human beings and their specific
categories of observation and knowledge classification.
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(see Buchler 1966). It is the principle of ontological parity that Buchler
contrasts with any dualism stating that one segment of reality–say, the
physical–is somehow more “real” than the mental. “Ontological priority” is
squarely evidenced in the empirical tradition, Buchler stated, and it has
had its hangover in many of the twentieth-century American naturalists
with their penchant for placing such stress on stating “evidence,” rather
than describing and reflecting upon observations. Hence, it seems that
Buchler has radicalized naturalism’s initial aims of knowing nature by
providing it with a more throughgoing opportunity for analysis into the
generic concepts of nature (rather than narrowly focusing on the material
aspects of nature and corresponding sense-data).
In summary, Buchler’s ordinal position means that there can be no
distinction between a “really” real world of fact, or nature, pace Hume, and
those values which are a “mere” addition to it, pace Quine. Intangibles,
discussed earlier in this essay, find rights to co-equal habitation alongside
perceived physical objects, all being part of what prevails in a nature
that is wider in a scope of what is and what can be known, privately
or socially: both encompassed by the domain of proception. The dual
epistemological and metaphysical desideratum in Buchler’s metaphysics
is, overall, one of relational interdependence that makes room for personal
and intangible experience to stand on its own as a form of acquaintance
with the natural world. Thus there can be no absolute primacy for any one
order of nature–there may be primacy in general, but unlike what is the
case in traditional epistemological and metaphysical views of naturalism,
it is not exhaustive of any one particular quality. Nature, unrestricted,
demands balance and harmony when one decides to choose which of
its innumerable orders that one would like to describe and know. Buchler
clarifies,
on the basis of the unrestricted view as stated thus far,
science would be said to be concerned not with nature in
an unqualified sense but with a given world of worlds–the
physical world, the social world, the psychological world. These
worlds are pervasive orders of nature, for we no longer can
make sense of “the” order of nature. . . A tenable conception
of nature recognizes many orders occupied by man among
the innumerable orders not occupied by man and many
orders devised by man. . . Nothing is implied about a totality
or whole or collectivity, no embarrassing commitment is made
to an ultimate integration which lacks integrity. (Buchler 1966,
273-74)
Rejecting an “ultimate” integration means no one order of nature
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(physical, ideal, social, biological, moral, logical, and so on) reigns
supreme. The physical universe, as great as it is, is but one world of
nature. The proceptive domain of nature takes nature to be an availability
of orders, not any one particular order of the world.
IV. CONCLUSION ON A PHENOMENOLOGICAL NOTE
The title of this essay reflects phenomenology in the American vein.
In asking how Buchler’s ordinal naturalism is phenomenological and takes
into account the widest available conception of nature, the philosophical
method developed by Edmund Husserl might provide a clue. Nature taken
in its “ordinality” means that one honors the scope and generic integrity
of any and all available objects, experiences, and dimensions available
for description within nature as such. Knowledge is redefined in terms
of relevance and description, and a field of epistemic objects is opened
up before the human inquirer that is not limited to the material realm.
One may reflect on the meaning and importance of these objects in
personal experience, and apply those reflections in the process of getting
acquainted with the natural world. The world and phenomena, relations
and qualities, things, facts, and values, all stand together without any
sense-perception privileging orders to sway or dominate a generic-level
analysis (Corrington 1992, x). In this way, Buchler’s term “order” signals
a sensitivity to the ways in which human beings experience nature in its
robust dimension, and “ordinality” serves to reminds us that all qualities
and relations are experienced fundamentally through relationships, an
“intangible”–they are located among other orders of nature (Corrington
1992, x). Traits being ontologically equal and neutral, preferring “physical
objects” to “Homer’s gods” would be just that: a preference, for one is just
as real as the other; each is an order among innumerable others.
Robert Corrington, entitling his own Buchlerian-inspired naturalism
“ecstatic naturalism,” claims that Buchler’s ordinal phenomenology agrees
with Husserl’s methodological aim in opening up a “descriptive clearing
within nature” that resists a “drive toward categorical encompassment
giving way before a more tentative and open-ended description of the
pervasive features of the world” (Corrinton 1992, x). On Corrington’s view,
and I agree, Buchler has also moved beyond Husserl in paving the way
for metaphysics and phenomenology to require each other. Corrington
notes that, as such, Buchler’s brand of phenomenology “does not privilege
consciousness by assuming that it must be the mysterious origin of all
phenomenal features. . . ,” indicating that neither the physical nor the ideal
is ascribed supremacy, and a Husserlian description of the essential
features of consciousness is turned toward the world at large (Corrington
1992, 2-3). Corrington continues that,
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ordinal phenomenology relies upon a very different conception
of naturalism and the natural standpoint. The ordinal
perspective understands naturalism to be inevitable and to
entail the human process to be fully embedded within a nature
that is forever beyond its own making. Yet naturalism, in this
view, does not entail materialism, physicalism, or any other
type of reductive monism. Ordinal naturalism rejects the very
notion that nature can be characterized as a specific ‘what’
or ‘essence.’ Put simply: nature is the constant availability of
orders of relevance, and not some kind of material substrate
that obeys rigid causal laws. (Corrington 1992, 13)
The following quotation from Husserl has a meaning that resembles
Buchler’s ordinal approach and it serves as a concluding note for my own
analysis. In the end I hope that I’ve brought Buchler’s thought into closer
connection with phenomenology and have illustrated as well a more just
and open understanding of nature by having explored Buchler’s ordinal
naturalism. I hope to have explicated how his phenomenological method
extends the range of human inquiry to include the many and varied traits of
natural phenomena that are not “simply” the result of sensate experience
or material functions, and that personal phenomenological reflection on
the intangible phenomena of experience may count as a way to become
acquainted with nature where nature means whatever exists, in any way.
I have an idea of the god Jupiter: this means that I have
a certain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-
god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness. The intentional
experience may be dismembered as one chooses in descriptive
analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be found in it.
The ‘immanent’, ‘mental object’ is not therefore part of the
descriptive or real make-up [deskriptiven reellen Bestand ] of
the experience, it is in truth not really immanent or mental. But
it also does not exist extramentally, it does not exist at all. This
does not prevent our idea of the god Jupiter from being actual,
a particular sort of experience. . . If the intended object exists
[my emphasis] nothing becomes phenomenologically different.
(Husserl 1901 [2001], 558-59)
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